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Over the past decade, the governments of El Salvador and
Costa Rica have taken bold steps to implement de facto mor-
atoria on ﬁnancially lucrative but environmentally destructive
mining. Both did so in order to protect the environment,
despite the prospect of historic proﬁts and in the face of reta-
liatory measures from transnational gold mining ﬁrms. Why
did they do this? Under what conditions do the governments
of poorer countries become active defenders and protectors
of the environment? Our goal is to explore and analyze the
conditions that inﬂuence such decisions and actions.
In this research, we are expanding on work we carried out
20 years ago when we looked at this same question, but with
poor people and communities, rather than national govern-
ments, as our unit of analysis. In 1994, one of us wrote an arti-
cle in World Development that challenged the traditional
argument that poorer people did not care about the environ-
ment and were often destructive of it. 1 We culled our analysis
from research for a book we had coauthored a year earlier, in
which we explored how organized poorer people led move-
ments to protect their natural resources in the Philippines. 2
Based primarily on our ﬁeldwork in that country, we posited
three conditions under which poorer people became not only
concerned about environmental issues, but also active defend-
ers and protectors of natural resources and the environment:
(1.) Environmental degradation threatens the natural-resource
base oﬀ of which people live; (2.) Poor people have lived in an
area for some time (a condition we subsequently term
“rootedness”) 3; (3.) Civil society is politicized and organized.
Our new research and analysis at the national level are
rooted in ﬁeld work in El Salvador and Costa Rica. We
selected these two case studies because in both, the national
governments have implemented policies placing bans or sig-
niﬁcant limits on gold mining due to its adverse environmental
impact. We use this government policy outcome on mining as
a dependent variable indicating a government’s decisive action
to protect the environment. To ensure that our case studies
focus on signiﬁcant environmental protections, we have cho-
sen cases in which such governmental “action” has prompted
legal actions by mining companies (in these cases, investor-
state lawsuits). Another indicator of the cases’ signiﬁcance is419that during the period of our research, the price of gold
reached historic highs, making the gold deposits in each coun-
try even more potentially lucrative. Under economic theory
(be it neoliberal or structuralist) 4, both governments would
have been expected to further encourage exports of gold.
Instead, each moved to limit or stop such exports. These case
studies thus provide the basis for our analysis of the conditions
that lead governments to protect the environment over short-
term economic or ﬁnancial gain.
As will be detailed in the article, in looking to explain what
led each government to change its mining policy for environ-
mental reasons (which, as stated above, is our dependent vari-
able), both of our case studies steered us to independent
variables that involve each of the three main societal group-
ings, or what Marc Nerﬁn termed the Citizen (civil society),
the Merchant (the private sector), and the Prince (govern-
ment) 5: (1.) civil society (including individual poorer people,
local organizations of poorer people, national-level organiza-
tions that include these local organizations, as well as other
segments of organized civil society including religious, aca-
demic, and development groups); (2.) the domestic private sec-
tor; and (3.) the government (in each country, the cases include
a time period covering more than one such democratically
elected president, and individuals and institutions in executive,
legislative, and/or judicial branches). We use these three cate-
gories as basic units of analysis to dig deeper into what hap-
pens within these non-homogeneous groupings to allow for
various actions or non-actions, silences, or agency. Tracing
actions and processes enables us to delineate what happens
and why, within each heterogeneous grouping, and between
and among categories. 6
This approach makes it possible for us not only to examine
civil society, the domestic private sector, government oﬃcials
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compare and contrast across the two countries in order to
highlight variables that seem common versus unique in the
two. After presenting the country case studies, we move to
examine more broadly the conditions under which poorer gov-
ernments take action to protect the environment. To be clear:
Our third independent variable is composed of oﬃcials and
agencies of government. We distinguish this from our depen-
dent variable: government policy and action to protect the
environment, a variable we argue is inﬂuenced by all three
independent variables, and interactions among them.
To foreshadow our analysis, our case studies lead toward
the conclusion that mobilization by poorer people related to
the environment, building to a broader organized civil society
on these issues, is one of three key conditions leading govern-
ments of poorer countries to take action on the environment.
Thus, our three 1994 conditions regarding poorer people are
still relevant at this new level of analysis. In addition, in our
post-case study analysis, we build from our case studies to
posit two other conditions—one related to the Merchant
and another to the Prince—that inﬂuence whether govern-
ments of poorer countries come to implement policies that
favor environmental ends over shorter term economic gains.
In terms of our methods, this article is based on ﬁeld work in
El Salvador in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, and Costa Rica in
2007 and 2014. In both countries, we conducted semi-struc-
tured interviews with government oﬃcials as well as with
individuals and representatives of groups of organized civil
society. 7 We had more limited interviews and interactions
with the domestic business sector. We also used participant
observation, especially in outlying regions where mining cor-
porations have initiated exploratory and/or actual mining
operations, or have indicated an interest in gold mining. We
supplemented this with primary and secondary sources. Nota-
bly, in the case of El Salvador, we had access to extensive gov-
ernment and corporate documents, including internal
communications that were made public as part of the submis-
sions to the international tribunal where mining companies
have sued governments. 8
We now move to lay a foundation of the relevant literature
related to how poorer people and poorer country governments
think and act about environmental issues. From there, we pro-
ceed to our two case studies, tracing actions and processes
from Citizen to Merchant to Prince. We then step back from
the case studies to oﬀer our three conditions and to raise ques-
tions for research on additional case studies while suggesting
the relevance of these conditions to other countries.2. THE LITERATURE AND CONVENTIONAL
UNDERSTANDINGS—1994–2014
To situate our analysis within literature on environment and
development: Much has changed since the analysis in our 1994
article (and 1993 book) about poorer people and the environ-
ment was greeted by many, especially in the United States, as
surprising. The prevailing wisdom then was that poverty (and
the poor) caused the majority of environmental degradation.
The more mainstream paradigm version of this, as seen in
neoliberal economics, held to an Environmental Kuznets
Curve (EKC, as best exempliﬁed by the work of Grossman
and Krueger (1995) at Princeton), maintaining that poorer
people and poorer governments would not care about the
environment until after a certain economic threshold was
reached. The more enlightened paradigm 9 of that day was
exempliﬁed by the 1987 so-called Brundtland Commission,which held that there was a direct causal feedback loop
between poverty and environmental degradation. 10 The solu-
tion for both paradigms was economic growth to make poorer
people and poorer countries richer—albeit with the Brundt-
land version acknowledging the need for a greener version of
growth.
Twenty years later, there is a vibrant literature in the “politi-
cal ecology” paradigm documenting that not only do poorer
people often care about natural resources, given their depen-
dence on intact ecosystems, but also that, especially when
empowered through community control of resources, their
actions can lead to socially and environmentally positive
outcomes. Our analytical frame builds on the political
ecology paradigm as broadly deﬁned, with its various
approaches. 11 Among them, Nobel laureate Ostrom (1990)
contributed to this ﬁeld with her empirical work on common
resource management. Political ecologists including Agrawal
and Yadama (1997), Shiva (2006), Colchester (2006), and
Boyce (2013) pushed further to demonstrate that “common
property rules” lead to environmentally “good” outcomes.
There is also a broad academic literature on extractives and
development in the political ecology frame, as exempliﬁed
by the work of geographer Gavin Bridge. 12 Alongside this
academic literature is a large and growing body of studies
and documentation from global, national, and local non-gov-
ernmental groups—including research groups, environmental
groups, human rights groups, indigenous peoples’ groups
and others—documenting the social, economic, and human
rights impacts of mining as the basis for advocacy. 13
A parallel, expanding academic and policy literature uses
empirical and ﬁeld research to question the applicability of
the EKC thesis and its contention that one has to be a richer
person in a richer country to care about the environment or
act to stop environmental degradation. 14 And, yet, the
Environmental Kuznets Curve, and the related assumption
that short-term economic exigencies stop poorer people and
poorer country governments from internalizing environmental
costs, continue to hold a powerful sway on mainstream media
and economic policy-makers. Witness the current, protracted
negotiations on the Doha Round, with the WTO’s and World
Bank’s argument that trade-induced economic growth in
poorer countries will lead to more environmental concern
and policies.
With this overview and literature foundation, let us now
move onto our case studies.
El Salvador and Costa Rica are two poorer nations where
the governments have responded to pressure from poorer
communities and from wider civil society to institute some
types of moratoria on gold mining despite heavy pressure from
foreign mining ﬁrms to allow mining. Both countries are part
of a large gold belt that runs down Central America. Histori-
cally, there has been gold mining in El Salvador, Costa Rica,
and the countries along that belt. In each of these case studies,
we ﬁrst oﬀer a brief background and overview, and then we
examine each of the three variables—Citizen, Merchant, and
Prince—into which we have separated our analysis. 153. EL SALVADOR CASE STUDY
Our ﬁrst case study is that of El Salvador, where citizen
movements began organizing against mining in 2004–05. By
2006–07, there was widespread opposition and the last gold
mining permit issued by the government was in mid-2006. 16
There is not a Congressional ban on mining (as in Costa Rica);
rather, as a result of three administrations not issuing mining
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seems exceptional, given the country’s relative economic pov-
erty and the relatively high price of gold.
In addition to having sizable reserves of gold and other
minerals, El Salvador is the most environmentally degraded
country and densely populated country in Central America.
According to the United Nations, after decades of severe
deforestation and pollution of its rivers, it is the second most
environmentally degraded country in all of Latin America and
the Caribbean after Haiti. And, its major river, the Lempa,
winds through gold country and provides drinking water for
over half the country’s population. 17
Commercial gold mining began in El Salvador over
110 years ago. As in other parts of the world, mining declined
during the Great Depression of the 1930s as global mineral
prices fell, but expanded after World War II. In El Salvador,
mining was largely halted during the civil war of 1980–92
due to security issues in the gold regions, and never picked
up signiﬁcantly after that.
However, as mineral prices began their steep ascent after
2000, the gold deposits of El Salvador attracted dozens of for-
eign mining ﬁrms. Several were granted exploration permits by
the government, including Paciﬁc Rim in the department (pro-
vince) of Caban˜as. Paciﬁc Rim was granted an exploration
license for its El Dorado project, yet by the time it applied
for an exploitation concession, the government’s view on gold
mining changed and the exploitation concession was never
approved.
In the three subsections that follow, we trace and analyze
the El Salvador case by separating it, as much as possible, into
each of the three parts of society. We move from civil society
or Citizen, to economic elite or Merchant, to government or
Prince.
(a) The citizen
Most accounts of El Salvador’s gold mining ban (including
our own) rightly begin with key individuals, mostly poorer
farmers, who came to have individual and local concerns
about mining. 18 They then transformed these local concerns
into a sophisticated, organized civil-society opposition to min-
ing based on its environmental and social costs and lack of
long-term economic beneﬁts. The key focus of local activists
was the gold belt in northern El Salvador, particularly the pro-
vinces of Chalatenango, Caban˜as, and La Union.
In Chalatenango, long a base of progressive activism in El
Salvador, farmers told us of Canadian mining executives ﬂying
into their province in 2005 looking for gold. These farmers
were instantly suspicious of the mining company claims of
jobs and prosperity, and so they organized trips into nearby
Honduras and Guatemala to view the impacts of mining there.
A local resident of one of town recounted a visit to a mine in
Honduras where they “saw with our own eyes these huge cra-
ters where they had cut oﬀ mountains,” a leeching pond that
was “a green lake” and “not one single living thing” in the
nearby river. Returning to Chalatenango with this knowledge
and photos and videos, they undertook a broad education
campaign. Activist groups linked with sympathetic municipal
oﬃcials and successfully kept the mining companies out.
And, the organized groups of Chalatenango knew that
Canadian mining ﬁrms were trying to gain access also to con-
cessions in the province directly across the Lempa River to the
east, Caban˜as. “So,” a middle-aged woman from Chalate-
nango told us, “we once sent a convoy of over 1,000 people
to help the communities in Caban˜as understand about” and
oppose mining “because they’re our neighbors.”Caban˜as is one of the poorest provinces in the country and
one of the more conservative politically. As opposed to
Chalatenango, the mayors and municipal councils of most of
Caban˜as at this time were from the right-wing ARENA party.
From dozens of interviews with farmers and other local resi-
dents of Caban˜as, we learned that when then-Canadian ﬁrm
Paciﬁc Rim ﬁrst showed up to explore for gold in Caban˜as,
many of those who would later become anti-mining activists
were not in opposition. Rather, they viewed mining as an
opportunity for jobs and economic growth for the poor pro-
vince. But, after they visited mining communities in Honduras,
after discussions with people in Chalatenango, and after they
experienced and saw the negative eﬀects of the exploration
wells dug by Paciﬁc Rim, opposition grew. They also traveled
further east within El Salvador to San Sebastian, La Union,
the site of a century of mining, most recently by Wisconsin-
based Commerce Group, where they found severe environ-
mental degradation. 19
Thus, key individuals in Caban˜as, many aﬃliated with local
environmental and development groups, joined those from
Chalatenango to increase public education and campaigns
against mining. As early as October 2005, these individuals
and organizations in Caban˜as had linked up with others
across the country to form the National Roundtable on
Metals Mining (La Mesa). 20
Groups in La Mesa framed their ﬁght not as being anti-min-
ing but as pro-water, and their educational materials have
focused on the fact that the majority of Salvadorans get water
from the Rio Lempa. Our research suggests that this framing
helped the opposition to gold mining gain majority support in
El Salvador, even in the local communities that might have
gained some mining jobs. So too did the fact that several lead-
ers of the Catholic Church, including the Salvadoran Council
of Catholic Bishops, expressed opposition. 21 For example, at
one gathering of about 500 at the Jesuit University of Central
America (UCA) in June 2006, then-UCA president Father
Jose Tojeira expressed his opposition to mining. 22 When the
audience (which included many from Caban˜as) overwhelm-
ingly expressed theirs, they were reminded that under Salvado-
ran law, mining could not go forward if the 100 or so in the
audience for whom it was relevant did not sell their land to
Pac Rim. The opposition suggested in that venue seems to
have reﬂected the majority view in Caban˜as: as our research
uncovered, Pac Rim never was able to get 87% of the necessary
land holdings, owned by over 1,000 people. 23 Countrywide,
over 62% of El Salvador’s population indicated opposition
to mining in a 2007 University of Central America poll. 24
(b) The merchant
Numerous foreign mining ﬁrms entered El Salvador in the
ﬁrst decade of the 2000s and pressured the government for
mining contracts. However, since there had been little com-
mercial mining in El Salvador in recent decades, these foreign
ﬁrms were not greeted by a strong local elite entrenched in
mining.
A key factor in El Salvador was the suspension of industrial
mining during the 12 years of the brutal civil war of 1980–92,
where over 75,000 people were killed. Gold prices were rela-
tively low in the 1990s, and hence mining did not pick up
much after the civil war. Therefore, when the mostly Canadian
mining ﬁrms came into the country over the past decade, there
were few entrenched local business leaders strongly invested in
mining. Referring to the historically small number of families
who have controlled El Salvador’s economy, one senior gov-
ernment oﬃcial explained that “some families that were
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tive endeavors” elsewhere. And, our research suggests, the
Canadian mining ﬁrms either chose not to, or were not able
to, establish a network of strong connections with local elites.
In addition, the relatively weak Salvadoran business inter-
ests in mining seem also to be related to the scarcity and fra-
gility of the water systems in the country. As with small
farmers, a segment of businesses in El Salvador depends on
water and is worried about the potential water contamination
that comes with gold mining. In El Salvador, there is a signiﬁ-
cant agriculture sector, with both agribusiness elites and smal-
ler entrepreneurs. As we discovered in our interviews, their
self-interests lead them to be concerned about the country’s
water quality and quantity, a reality brought home by recent
droughts. And, there is a tourism sector—albeit not as large
as in some of its neighboring countries—and this too depends
on water. Business leaders from these sectors have not typi-
cally come out publicly and vocally against mining, but their
silence and the silence of most of the rest of the domestic busi-
ness elite on mining has helped the anti-mining forces. One
expert in the legislature put it this way: “By not saying any-
thing, they are saying a lot. By not supporting mining, they
are doing a lot.” Senior oﬃcials of Ministry of Environment
(MARN) told us in 2014 that they had, at least since the Funes
administration, to their surprise “never” been lobbied by Sal-
vadoran business interests in favor of mining.
Indeed, the pro-mining business lobby in El Salvador
remained weak and concentrated among individuals employed
by the foreign mining companies or, subsequently, hired as
part of their pro-mining lobbying eﬀort. To the extent there
was a local face of Paciﬁc Rim, it was their oﬃcial, Salvadoran
national (and former MARN oﬃcial) Ericka Colindres, but
Colindres was seen as a junior spokesperson for foreign min-
ing, not as a strong pro-mining local economic elite. Indeed,
in 2010, when Congress moved to hold hearings on a potential
mining ban, Colindres was a key mining proponent who tried
to lobby Congress, according to one Congressional insider.
Documentation supports this: hers was the ﬁrst of ﬁve mining
oﬃcials’ signatures on a 1-page letter requesting a Congres-
sional meeting. 25 But, the Congressional insider explained,
the lack of active domestic elite participation was seen as a sig-
niﬁcant statement of the weakness of the domestic elite sup-
porting mining, especially in comparison to the strength of
the opposition to mining. Elite public supporters have
included, notably, former Finance Minister Manuel Hinds,
but this should come as little surprise as he was a paid consul-
tant to Paciﬁc Rim. Only in 2013 did the Salvadoran business
group Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales (ASI) come out
publicly in favor of mining. 26 However, according to one
FMLN advisor, the statement was not “very strong” and cer-
tainly not strong enough to sway government opinion.
(c) The prince
After the Salvadoran civil war ended in 1992, the right-wing
ARENA party held the presidency for the next 17 years. How-
ever, the progressive FMLN won the presidency in 2009,
bringing in a government much more accountable to the inter-
ests of small farmers and workers, which then declared it was
continuing the de facto mining ban. As of 2015, the FMLN
retains the presidency, but does not hold a majority in Con-
gress. Hence there has been no Congressional ban on mining,
but the executive branch continues to be committed to no min-
ing.
What is less well known in the El Salvador story is that the
actual cessation of mining permits began in the last ARENAadministration, that of President “Tony” Saca (2004–09), a
reign that was marked by corruption scandals. 27 Few of those
chronicling mining seem to realize that it was the Saca
administration of the right-wing ARENA party that did not
approve Paciﬁc Rim’s exploitation concession. While some
we interviewed suggest that Paciﬁc Rim simply did not oﬀer
Saca a high enough bribe, there is more to the story.
Saca’s administration overall was extremely welcoming to
foreign investment and Saca’s Vice President, Ana Vilma de
Escobar, had previously worked on the promotion of private
investment at the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Paciﬁc Rim had close and direct ties to her oﬃce. Indeed, Pac
Rim’s legal case is heavily based on its assertions that a top
oﬃcial in the Saca administration assured it that it would
get a mining license.
Our research suggests that Saca’s Minister of the Environ-
ment, Hugo Barrera (2004–06), grew to appreciate the fragile
environmental state of the country. A businessman with
strong ties to the ruling right-wing party, Barrera was not con-
sidered to be “pro-environment” when he was appointed.
However, Barrera did agree to attend the June 2006 University
of Central America gathering of around 500 people mentioned
earlier. According to ﬁrst-hand reports, he stunned the audi-
ence when he used the occasion to publicly announce that,
while he was not for or against mining overall, he did not
think one could mine in El Salvador without destroying the
environment. 28
The Ministry under Barrera did not reject Pac Rim’s appli-
cation for an environmental permit; it simply did not act upon
it. While some see this as an oversight and an indication of
incompetence, our research (backed by the ICSID submis-
sions) suggests this was a conscious act of disapproving by
not acting. As pointed out in El Salvador’s ICSID submission,
Pac Rim’s application was deﬁcient in three areas required
under Salvadoran law, including a complete environmental
impact statement, a feasibility study, and Pac Rim proof of
land titles or permission to mine. 29
Our research conﬁrms that the year 2006 was pivotal,
involving further actions on the part of MARN, the Ministry
of Economy (MinEc), and other parts of the Saca govern-
ment. 30 For example, the month after the large University
of Central America gathering, MARN revoked the environ-
mental permit of Commerce Group in the eastern province
of La Union, given the severely contaminated soil and
rivers. 31
In July 2006, the Salvadoran government (through MinEc,
like MARN headed by someone not known to be pro-environ-
ment) hired Peruvian environmental lawyer Manuel Pulgar-
Vidal Otalora as a consultant on mining policy. In August
2006, Pulgar-Vidal recommended that the country undertake
a strategic environmental review of the costs and beneﬁts of
mining and the regulatory capacity of the government vis-a`-
vis mining. 32 In May 2007, MARN and the Ministry of the
Economy announced to mining corporations that there would
be no more environmental permits related to metallic mining
until such a strategic environmental review was completed
and necessary policy changes were implemented. 33 This is
what marked the start of what has become a de facto morator-
ium on mining in the country since 2007 34 – although Pac
Rim was alerted to problems with its potential concession as
early as 2005. Saca publicly expressed concern for the environ-
mental implications of mining in March 2008, echoing the
apprehension that lead to the de facto moratorium imple-
mented by his two ministers in May 2007. 35 Both leading par-
ties supported the de-facto moratorium as part of the
campaigns for the 2009 presidential elections.
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FMLN declared an executive branch moratorium on metals
mining, which he maintained throughout his administration.
It is no coincidence that in 2009, both Paciﬁc Rim and Com-
merce Group shifted tactics in their ﬁght to mine in El Sal-
vador. Instead, they initiated international arbitration
against El Salvador at the World Bank Group’s International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) based
on a controversial Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA) with the United States, and on El Salvador’s former
investment law (written with the help of the World Bank 36),
which opened the door for foreign investors to sue these gov-
ernments for policies that impeded future proﬁts.
In June 2014, El Salvador ushered in the new presidential
administration of former FMLN comandante, Salvador San-
chez Ceren. Sanchez Ceren also publicly committed to con-
tinuing the executive branch moratorium. The commitment
seemed even stronger than the prior administration’s, as seen
in such appointees as Lina Pohl to head MARN, with Angel
Ibarra as her deputy. Both have been quite critical of mining
and Ibarra is widely viewed as one of the pre-eminent environ-
mentalists in the country and was deeply involved with a wide
array of civil society groups committed to no mining and to
water as a human right. Even Sanchez Ceren’s Economy Min-
ister, former businessman Tharsis Salomon Lopez, empha-
sized his commitment to the moratorium based on
environmental concerns, explaining (in a July 2014 interview
with us) that El Salvador “should be called Lempa. . .because
the river is everything.” The government continues to demon-
strate its seriousness to maintain the mining moratorium; it
has already spent over $12 million to defend itself against
Pac Rim’s suit at the World Bank’s ICSID.
In sum, an extremely well-organized civil society, rooted in
the gold mining provinces, galvanized public opinion against
mining, largely on environmental grounds. Despite heavy lob-
bying from foreign mining ﬁrms, the local business support for
mining was weak. Key parts of the executive branch grew to
be opposed to, or wary of, mining as detailed above. These
factors coalesced to lead three successive administrations to
halt mining.4. COSTA RICA CASE STUDY
Our second case study is that of Costa Rica, where all
three branches of government have taken action since
2002 to severely restrict gold mining. President Abel Pacheco
ﬁrst instituted a ban on new open pit mining in 2002, and
successive presidents (with the exception of 2008–10) 37 have
kept this in place. In 2010, the legislature instituted a similar
ban on open pit mining and, more broadly, mining that used
cyanide. 38 And the Supreme Court has upheld the ban,
despite challenges.
What Pacheco started in 2002 was a change from Costa
Rica’s past. Thirteen hundred years ago, the inhabitants of
what would become Costa Rica learned the technology to melt
and shape the gold nuggets they found in their rivers into
small ﬁgurines. Hundreds of years later, the proliferation of
such ﬁgurines would lead Spanish explorers to think they
had discovered the riches they sought and they named
the region “Costa Rica,” or rich coast. 39 In the modern
era, gold mining began in 1813 and, by 1833, gold accounted
for almost half the exports of the country. 40
Gold was supplanted by coﬀee and later bananas and other
products, but mining ﬁrms and artisanal miners have mined
the country for two centuries. Then, in the 1980s and 1990s,despite the trade liberalization wave that led governments to
open their economies to foreign investment, 41 the government
of Costa Rica took a decisive turn to preserve its rich biodiver-
sity by greatly expanding the system of national parks. 42 This
facilitated a push toward ecotourism, and since 1995 tourism
has been one of the largest sources of foreign exchange and
employment in the country.
Given the key role of environment to Costa Rica’s path,
industrial mining has been seen by many as a threat. Indeed,
there have been numerous local struggles against mining com-
panies in Costa Rica over the past several decades, but two
cases in diﬀerent regions of the country have particularly
deﬁned the contemporary debates over mining in Costa
Rica. 43 The ﬁrst was a ﬁght in the western town of Miramar
over a gold mine that eventually opened in 2005 (it was
allowed because the company got its license to mine before
the 2002 government decree) and then was closed after a dis-
astrous landslide in 2007. The second was over what would
have become one of the largest gold mines in Central America
in the northern village of Crucitas. A strong citizens’ move-
ment successfully pressured the government to close down
Canadian mining company Inﬁnito Gold’s Crucitas operation
and pass the legislative ban. Inﬁnito Gold then sued the Costa
Rican government in ICSID in 2014.
As in El Salvador, the speciﬁc structures of and interaction
among forces within civil society, business, and government
deﬁned these struggles, which led to the government actions
to stop most mining. To present this case study analytically,
we proceed by examining the three sectors of society, moving
from the citizen and civil society, to the merchant and ﬁnally
to the prince, in seeking to understand better what led to deci-
sive Costa Rican government action to protect the environ-
ment. 44
(a) The citizen
To understand public opposition to corporate mining in
Costa Rica, it is important to understand the central role that
the environment plays in the country’s economy, society, and
culture. Costa Rica, as we are continually reminded, is a
biodiversity “superpower” with among the most species of
ﬂora and fauna per square kilometer of any nation on earth. 45
Successive governments over the past 40 years have recognized
this and they have carved out ever-larger areas of the country
for national parks and conservation eﬀorts. 46 Treasuring the
environment is central to school curricula. A wide range of
Costa Ricans described to us their deep bond with the environ-
ment. One San Jose-based anti-mining activist put it this way:
“Costa Ricans love their environment. . .. We don’t envy the
[economic] richness of Europe because we have our own
[environmental] richness.”
Mining ﬁrms began their eﬀorts to mine in Mirimar and in
Crucitas in the 1990s before the price of gold skyrocketed.
Opposition to the mine in Mirimar sprang up in 1996 among
local groups deeply concerned about the toxic eﬀects that cya-
nide, used to extract gold, would have on springs, rivers, and
forests. 47 Despite strong local opposition and a number of
heated legal battles, Glencairn won the legal right to start min-
ing at Miramar in 2005. Glencairn clear cut forests and dug an
open pit mine on the side of a mountain—an area with heavy
rainfall and prone to earthquakes. In 2007, what many local
people predicted actually became a reality: parts of the mine
collapsed in a landslide that also buried much of the com-
pany’s mining equipment, and the mine was shut down. 48
While the landslide attracted national attention, it was
eclipsed in part by the huge public debate over the Central
424 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAmerican Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). While CAFTA
was ﬁnally narrowly approved through a referendum in Costa
Rica in October 2007, a broad-based activist community
remained deeply outraged. One year later, in October 2008,
President Arias gave the green light to Inﬁnito for its mine
at Crucitas (arguing that it was in the “national interest”);
almost immediately, Inﬁnito began a major clear-cutting of
the mining site. As University of Costa Rica professor Nicolas
Boeglin explained: such action as this at “Crucitas was what
[the] people who were against CAFTA had in mind.” Quickly,
more activists shifted their focus to stopping that mine and
won a court-ordered halt to Inﬁnito’s activities later in Octo-
ber 2008.
During 2008–10, activists, lawyers, and a group of aca-
demics expanded their anti-Crucitas campaigns, including
(among other activities) marches and hunger strikes. 49 The
courts went back and forth over whether Crucitas could begin
mining, but one tribunal reaﬃrmed the illegality of the Inﬁnito
project in November 2010, conﬁrmed by one branch of the
Supreme Court in November 2011. Congress passed its ban
on new open-pit mining in early November 2010, which the
Supreme Court upheld in 2013. There has been no new
open-pit mining in Costa Rica since.
As in the Salvadoran mining cases, both the Mirimar and
Crucitas cases started with individuals and citizen groups in
the aﬀected areas. These later linked to larger national eﬀorts
centered in the capital city of San Jose. In Mirimar, a Miramar
Natural Resources Defense Group began operating in 1996,
and other groups such as the Front Committee of Opposition
to Mining in Miramar came together in the ensuing years
of struggle. 50
In the Crucitas ﬁght, the city of San Carlos about 60 km to
the south of Crucitas served as a focal point of resistance.
Many in that city had fought a successful ﬁght 30 years earlier
against another mining company. These lawyers, media acti-
vists, and others swung into action in the 1990s when they
heard about the Crucitas plans, and they launched a series
of legal, media, and activist actions against the ﬁrm.
But opposition to mining was not limited to the local areas.
Also key in terms of civil-society actions and reactions was
what has been called “Central Valley indignation,” referring
to the outrage expressed by people in the capital city of San
Jose and its surrounding suburbs as the story of Crucitas
spread. Interviewees referred to the broad range of “urban
environmentalists” in universities and among the broad urban
middle class who care deeply about the environment. This is
not a phenomenon we witnessed in El Salvador, but it has
been a potent force for protest in Costa Rica.
An extremely eﬀective ally of citizen groups in Costa Rica
was a group of academics—who called themselves Llamado
Urgento—who were able to use their various academic exper-
tise (including geology) to spread education about the negative
impacts of mining and mining ﬁrms. One member was Univer-
sity of Costa Rica law professor Nicholas Boeglin. He and his
colleagues, in this country where libel and slander lawsuits are
liberally deployed by corporations, were aided by the fact that
the University of Costa Rica aggressively protects freedom of
speech within its walls. Boeglin told us that this group of
roughly 20 professors from many disciplines became activated
to work against the mining ﬁrms in 2008 when then-president
Oscar Arias decreed that the Crucitas mine was in the “na-
tional interest.”
So too in Costa Rica did the church play a role in terms of
public opinion, especially (we are told) when the Catholic
Bishops Conference came out in the midst of this ﬁght in
opposition to the Crucitas mine.Our interviews also unearthed another important strategy of
the citizen groups in these Costa Rica ﬁghts. They deployed
the media more eﬀectively than the companies did. Several
referred to the deﬁning moment of the anti-Inﬁnito ﬁght being
Edgardo Araya (then San Carlos-based lawyer; now Con-
gressman) ﬂying in a television-news helicopter over the wide
area that Inﬁnito clear cut in Crucitas after Arias’ October
2008 decree. “Those images changed everything,” one self-
described activist told us. Polls right after this incident showed
85–90% of the public opposed to the Crucitas project. And the
TV images provoked further Central Valley indignation and
also action: a spontaneous march of San Jose activists to
Crucitas, a march back to San Jose by the communities in
the north, a hunger strike in San Jose, and an outburst of acti-
vism that culminated in the legislative ban on new mining.
Much less successful was the media campaign waged by Inﬁ-
nito in favor of the mine which included billboards, newspaper
ads, and television ads on busses that touted the beneﬁts of
“green mining.” Stressed a San Jose-based activist: “These
simply strengthened Central Valley indignation” against the
mining company. So too did Inﬁnito’s law suits against key
academics and lawyers, including Boeglin and Araya, provoke
more citizen outrage and anti-mining conviction.
One ﬁnal point about the citizen campaigns in Costa Rica.
Whereas in El Salvador, there is one over-arching anti-mining
coalition, La Mesa, there is no equivalent in Costa Rica. This,
we are told by those involved, made it more diﬃcult for the
mining ﬁrms to counter-attack. In the analysis of former
San Carlos journalist and activist and now legislative aide
(to Araya) Marco Tulio Araya Barboza: “We,” the anti-min-
ing movement, were “a snake with many heads. . .. When there
is only one national coalition, then the company can bribe you
. . . [or] even kill you” to “cut oﬀ” the head. But when there are
many heads, “cut oﬀ one head, and others . . . pop up.” Much
of the ﬁght against Crucitas was waged from the largest city
near Crucitas, San Carlos, and the coordination with allies
in the capital city of San Jose was often minimal. Indeed,
San Jose-based activists told us that many of them met the
people from San Carlos and the north who had been ﬁghting
the ﬁrm for over a decade only during the 2010 march. While
one can analyze the pros and cons of this in the abstract, the
combined eﬀect of these diverse eﬀorts appears to have been
quite potent, while also making it hard for the company and
its supporters to defuse the anti-mining movement in Costa
Rica.
In sum: local and regional groups started the anti-mining
initiatives and sustained them. Their power grew as San
Jose-based activists and groups took up their ﬁghts. In terms
of speciﬁc actors beyond local popular organizations and
local, regional, and national non-governmental organizations,
lawyers played a key role. Academics came together across
disciplines and became eﬀective advocates. Opposition to min-
ing by the church, as in El Salvador, was important. And, citi-
zen groups made eﬀective and creative use of the media.
(b) The merchant
There has been mining in Costa Rica for centuries, but (as
has been explained earlier) other than a portion of the 19th
century, it has never played a central role in the economy.
Had the Crucitas mine been built, it would have generated
huge export earnings, but no other mine ever made a large
impact on the economy. Hence, there is only a small set of
the domestic elite that is wedded to mining. On the other hand,
there are signiﬁcant business interests that could be harmed
by the pollution to rivers and soil that often comes with
POORER COUNTRIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FRIENDS OR FOES? 425large-scalemining. Tourism,much of it “eco-tourism,” has been
one of the largest foreign exchange earners since the 1990s; close
to two and a half million visitors came to the country in 2013. 51
And, bananas, coﬀee, and other plantation crops, all requiring
large quantities of water that could be threatened by mining,
are key export earners. So, as in El Salvador, the proportion
of business interests that could be harmed by mining is larger
than the set of business interests thatwould beneﬁt frommining.
We asked people in government, academia, and civil society
what impact the domestic business community had on the
mining debates and struggles in the country. We found unani-
mous agreement that domestic elites provided little support for
mining. We were told that, in addition to the Chamber of
Mines, there were some ﬁrms in the north that supported
the Crucitas mine, from ranchers to those in construction
and road building. However, those business people who might
be adversely aﬀected were stronger.
Our research suggests that business leaders from the tourism
and agribusiness sectors did not publicly oppose the mine;
rather, they were silent. And, as in El Salvador, that silence
helped the opposition.
(c) The prince
Successive administrations in Costa Rica have initiated
environmental conservation policies for several decades. In
terms of mining, President Abel Pacheco implemented the ﬁrst
presidential ban on new open pit mining in 2002, with pressure
from civil society (and, some told us, an environmentally sensi-
tive son). 52 Under pressure from Inﬁnito Gold, the next presi-
dent, Oscar Arias, rescinded that ban for Crucitas in 2008, 53
which opened the door to the two-year battle described above.
His successor, Laura Chinchilla, was elected amidst the huge
national debate on mining in 2010 and was president as Con-
gress banned new open pit mining. That “no” was upheld by
decisions of the Costa Rican Supreme Court on cases that
involved two speciﬁc mining sites as well as the overall policy.
In addition to the factors laid out in the sections on the citi-
zen and the merchant, what are other factors that have led all
three branches of government to stand up to mining interests
for much of the past decade in favor of the greater public and
environmental interests of the nation? We conclude that there
have been several.
The executive branch has played many roles in pressing for
environmental protection and in advancing a culture of
“greenness.” There is a strong history of democratic institu-
tions and rule, and Costa Rica is one of the few countries in
the world to abolish its military, leaving greater resources
for such key democracy-building institutions as health, educa-
tion, and social safety net programs. Its political parties are far
less polarized than in El Salvador, although there was deep
polarization in the ﬁght over free trade and CAFTA. And,
by 2014, knowledgeable and respected activists, such as Con-
gressman Edgardo Araya, had entered the government sphere.
There are other factors. While business interests do have
inﬂuence in all branches of the Costa Rican government, there
is a history of that government standing up to parts of that
business community at diﬀerent moments of history. Araya
added one related detail in terms of the Costa Rican justices
who ruled in favor of the mining ban: “We had young,
independent judges in this case who rejected all the pressure
of the company and their lawyers.”
The government of Luis Guillermo Solis, elected in 2014, has
indicated its intent to adhere to this policy of a mining ban. In
February 2014, Inﬁnito Gold announced that, rather than
accepting the Supreme Court’s rejection of its appeal on theban, it was initiating an investor-state case against Costa Rica
in ICSID, which it subsequently ﬁled. 54 Still, the government
proclaimed its intent to not budge on the Crucitas mine, even
as the lawsuit is projected to cost each side $2 million a year.5. ANALYTICAL INSIGHTS: FROM EL SALVADOR
AND COSTA RICA TO IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER
COUNTRIES
Now that we have looked in depth at two case studies, let us
examine them together to gain further analytical insights.
What can we learn from similarities and diﬀerences in our pos-
ited independent variables, and can we posit a new set of con-
ditions under which governments of poorer countries
implement serious environmental policies?
In both Salvadoran and Costa Rican metallic mining policy,
all three independent variables came into play and reinforced
one another. In both countries, there was strong local citizen
opposition to mining that combined with other civil society
actors to form strong national movements against mining.
In El Salvador, rural farmers and communities provided the
initial spark, with the church playing a signiﬁcant integral role.
In Costa Rica, rural communities were crucial, but urban
environmentalists played a strong role, as did academics and
the media.
In terms of the Merchant, in both countries, local and
national business interests collectively had more to lose than
gain from industrial mining and its ensuing environmental
damage. In El Salvador, the farming and tourism sectors need
water that mining could further contaminate. The economic
elite connected to these sectors are currently more numerous
and powerful than local businesses that would beneﬁt from
foreign mining companies gaining mining concessions. In
Costa Rica, the many sectors that beneﬁt from eco-tourism
(and agriculture) are similarly more numerous and powerful
than the relatively small mining sector. In both countries, we
found that it was not necessarily that segments of the Mer-
chant were actively or vocally against mining; rather, their
inaction or silence was signiﬁcant.
As for the Prince, in both countries, at diﬀerent times, there
were individual allies and sometimes whole agencies within
government who spoke out or took action against mining.
The ﬁrst two independent variables, strong civil society and
weak pro-mining domestic business elites, seem particularly
important since the recent histories of both El Salvador and
Costa Rica reveal much more variation within key govern-
ment agencies during the period in question: In El Salvador,
even a relatively corrupt and pro-foreign business administra-
tion such as Tony Saca’s could take action against gold mining
because of strong civil society, weak pro-mining national busi-
ness elites, and the extreme environmental degradation of the
country. Here, individuals in the Saca government did indeed
seem to make a diﬀerence—but, also important to note, with
no apparent silencing by Saca. And, in Costa Rica, there is
the two year period of 2008–10 when, even with strong civil
society, weak pro-mining national business elites, and a demo-
cratic government, the administration of Oscar Arias was
swayed by Inﬁnito Gold to allow it permission to mine. Yet,
even in this instance, a strong civil society and an independent
Supreme Court eventually overturned Arias’ pro-mining poli-
cies and stopped Inﬁnito’s mining.
It is also revealing to compare the extent of government
action. On one hand, Costa Rica has a more limited ban
on new open pit mining, while previously licensed under-
ground mining continues. On the other hand, the Costa Rican
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branch to legislative and judiciary. In El Salvador, while key
Congressional ﬁgures have been committed to passing some
kind of Congressional ban on mining for years, such legisla-
tion has yet to move out of committee. Our research suggests
that this is partially a reﬂection of diﬀering political econ-
omy—with Costa Rica having clear, already proven alterna-
tives for economic progress, notably eco-tourism. As
compared to El Salvador, Costa Rica also stands out for its
longer standing democratic governing institutions. Both coun-
tries, however, are heavily dependent on agriculture and
agribusiness.
However, to return to the striking similarities in policy out-
comes which led us to choose these two case studies in the ﬁrst
place: both of these governments decisively halted gold mining
even though both are relatively poor, small countries, standing
up against the mining corporations and governments of the
much more powerful United States and Canada. And, thus,
moving from our speciﬁc case studies to more generalizable
conclusions: Our overall conclusion from our El Salvador
and Costa Rica case studies is that the combination of our
three independent variables created the conditions to aﬀect
our dependent variable, namely to result in decisive govern-
ment action in both countries on behalf of the environment.
Beyond these two countries, our case study ﬁndings oﬀer
ample evidence for us to posit the following three conditions
for poorer governments to take action to protect the environ-
ment, even while sacriﬁcing potentially lucrative foreign
exchange earnings:
1) The Citizen—conditions related to civil society: Poorer
people, whose natural resource base is threatened by min-
ing move from individual awareness to concern, to become
organized, and to engage with other sectors of civil society
in pressuring their government to implement policy
changes. This ﬁrst condition draws from and expands upon
our 1994 conclusion regarding the three conditions under
which poorer people take decisive pro-environment stances
and actions. In other words, there is a combination of
poorer people who have lived in the area long enough to
grasp the environmental damage, and other segments of
domestic civil society provide additional support and voice.
Organizing begins locally in the mining areas but moves to
a national level in both countries, putting pressure on
governments.
2) The Merchant—conditions related to domestic eco-
nomic elites and a political economy argument: Segments
of the domestic economic elite who have interests based
in protecting natural resources are more powerful than
the elite and corporate interests that beneﬁt from exploiting
minerals. The power of the global “merchant” is not strong
enough, or is not connected enough to local economic
elites, to change this calculus. Thus, foreign mining ﬁrms
that want to mine move from the national level (where they
have not been successful) into the global arena, where they
sue the governments under investment agreements and
investor-state dispute structures. 55
3) The Prince—conditions related to governments: We ﬁnd
that individuals and agencies within democratic govern-
ments who are willing and able not only to respond to civil
society, but also to understand the ecological realities of
natural resource exploitation, play a central role. The back-
ground of government oﬃcials is an important factor that
increases the likelihoodof this change.Notable are situations
where individual members of organized civil society groups
(mentioned in condition #1) have become part of the govern-
ment. But, this is not necessary; we also ﬁnd that far-sightedpolitical leaders or bureaucrats, regardless of their party’s
politics, who come into oﬃce with either an understanding
of environmental issues or a willingness to listen to non-gov-
ernmental experts, can also become catalysts.
We have not focused in detail on connections to and among
global civil society in this paper. This might seem a void given
the literature on this, growing from the seminal work of Keck
and Sikkink (1998). However, this is not what we found in our
research in either country. To the extent international civil
society groups were involved in El Salvador’s anti-mining
work pre-2008, it was mostly via Oxfam and Catholic Relief
Services and funding of local groups and speciﬁc projects. 56
Wider international outrage and support did not occur until
after 2009—and the assassination of at least four anti-mining
activists in Caban˜as—with the 2011 formation of a loose coali-
tion called International Allies. 57 In Costa Rica, international
support was also limited. Indeed, an argument could be made
that the most important “international support” in Costa Rica
came indirectly via eco-tourism dollars.
On the other hand, in terms of international political econ-
omy, El Salvador and Costa Rica did experience the global
connections among corporations and, notably, the global
“brotherhood” of mining companies and individuals. Case in
point is Canadian/Australian OceanaGold coming to the
ﬁnancial rescue of Paciﬁc Rim in 2013. Without this, Pac
Rim would have had to drop its case in ICSID. In the current
article’s focus on the three sets of domestic actors, we chose
not to detail these global connections (which we have focused
on elsewhere). 58
Thus far, in the limited literature that exists onminingbans, El
Salvador and Costa Rica have been viewed as “outliers”—the
exceptions to the rule—on mining policy in an era where many
governments have embraced global mining corporations and
walked down the path of extractive-based economic growth. 59
WitnessHonduras, Guatemala, PapuaNewGuinea, Indonesia,
and much of Africa, where governments have responded to the
promise of plentiful foreign-exchange to open their doors even
further to environmentally destructive mining.
We need further case studies to add to our understanding of
when governments in poorer countries take decisive action to
protect the environment and when they do not. We hope this
article—with its focus on El Salvador and Costa Rica—might
motivate others with the relevant expertise to analyze the
extent to which our three conditions do or do not hold in these
other countries.
In countries where governments continue to favor large-
scale mining, what were the particularities found in the three
societal groupings—the Citizen, the Merchant, and the
Prince—that inﬂuence government action? In Guatemala, for
example, there is strong civil society opposition to gold min-
ing, but domestic elite business interests are heavily invested
in mining and the current national government is closely
intertwined with those business elites. 60 Which of the
conditions held or did not hold in Honduras in 2009 under
President Manuel Zelaya, whose government was poised to
implement a new mining law even stronger than Costa Rica’s?
Does such analysis help us understand Zelaya’s ouster and the
subsequent government’s signiﬁcant increase in mining con-
cessions? 61 And, what of mineral-rich countries, such as
Mongolia, where civil society organizations do not exist to
the extent we found them in El Salvador and Costa Rica, or
reach only some parts of a country, or do not scale up from
local concerns to national levels of advocacy?
Likewise, our conclusions suggest further probing of
another set of countries, particularly in Latin America, where
governments have placed some more limited restrictions on
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glaciers in Argentina, a ban on mining in rivers in Guyana,
and a ban on mining in indigenous areas in Panama, for exam-
ple. Here too we hope that our research will provoke others to
analyze deeper the extent to which any of our three conditions
hold in these countries. It would be illuminating to analyze the
three conditions in other countries where some provincial gov-
ernments, as in the Philippines and Argentina, have taken
steps on mining for environmental reasons.
Indeed, the Philippines (where we have also conducted ﬁeld
research) would be a useful case for comparing and contrast-
ing the roles of the Citizen, the Merchant, and the Prince. The
Philippines has strong civil society organizations and a current
government that includes individuals in the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches that one might expect to be con-
cerned about the environmental impacts of mining. This
raises the question of whether it is the domestic elite links to
mining—and the underlying political economy of mining—
that explain why the national government’s policy debate
about mining has thus far focused on marginal reform (and
increasing revenue from mining) rather than signiﬁcant action
to resolve environmental issues. Related to this, in the Philip-
pines, as well as in other countries like Indonesia, Nigeria, and
the DRC, does mining and other extractive activity continue
at least in part because the global mining elite has long estab-
lished connections with local mining and extractives elites?
And to what extent, in such cases as the Philippines, where
provincial mining bans have been overruled at the nationallevel, does the reality of far-ﬂung islands, with multiple ecosys-
tems and watersheds (versus El Salvador, where a single, large
watershed has linked local to national self-interests), explain
why environmental concerns that galvanize the Citizen and
the Prince at the local level have not successfully scaled up
to the national level? 62
Finally, it would be instructive to probe the extent to which
the three conditions apply to governments of poorer countries
taking action on other environmental issues beyond extrac-
tives and mining. There are recent initiatives in certain coun-
tries on the “right to water,” on climate change, and on
sustainable agriculture, to name but three. Would researchers
ﬁnd that countries where there are positive initiatives on the
environment in any of these areas also have strong evidence
of our three conditions being present?
As for last words: At a most basic level, in our analysis of El
Salvador and Costa Rica, we present two case studies to add
to the political ecology literature. And, in expanding our focus
to government actions, we also provide evidence that refutes
the Environmental Kuznets Curve.
Just as the past twenty years has led to a growing under-
standing of the conditions under which poorer people protect
their environment, we hope that this article will contribute to a
deeper analysis of the conditions—for Citizen, for Merchant,
and for Prince—under which governments of poorer countries
act assertively to protect their environment.NOTES1. Broad (1994).
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